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INTRODUCTION
In this brief essay, I seek to demonstrate
the significance of exploratory behavior
for understanding cognitive development.
Historically, organisms were thought to
act solely in the service of achieving bio-
logically significant goals, such as satisfy-
ing thirst, hunger, and reproductive drives.
However, it became apparent that both
animals and humans engage in behavior
where the adaptive goal is unclear (see
Hunt, 1963, 1965). With no obvious exter-
nal target, this activity is best described
as being intrinsically motivated, and often
directed toward the unknown and the
unexpected (Kagan, 2002). Hence novelty,
the discrepancy between what is known
and what is discovered, can elicit activity
and exploration of the environment.
What is the relevance to developmen-
tal process? Attention to novelty plays
a seemingly simple role in learning and
development, directing the senses toward
what is as yet unknown. Yet, research
shows that patterns of attention to nov-
elty are not straightforward, particularly
during infancy. There is considerable evi-
dence that attention is sometimes biased
toward familiarity, rather than novelty.
Unlike our understanding of novelty pref-
erence, we struggle to understand when
and why familiarity preferences occur.
Below I briefly review this area of research
and illustrate how this basic aspect of
learning continues to puzzle developmen-
tal psychologists.
FROM ANIMALS TO INFANTS?
The habituation mechanism, which
directs attention to novelty, has been
widely-studied across the animal king-
dom (Sokolov, 1963; Thompson and
Spencer, 1966). Thorpe (1963) defined
habituation as “the relatively permanent
waning of a response as a result of repeated
stimulation . . . ” (p. 61). An important
feature of habituation is that an organism’s
responding will recover to the presentation
of a different stimulus—an effect known as
dishabituation (Thompson and Spencer,
1966). Hence, habituation is stimulus–
specific and attention will recover to novel
stimuli. A seminal study by Fantz (1964)
demonstrated that infants’ visual attention
to a familiar, repeated image will decrease
relative to their attention to a novel image.
Other early studies of infant habituation
also reveal infants’ interest in novel stimuli
(see Cohen andGelber, 1975, for a review).
There is evidence that even newborns
will habituate and direct their attention
to novelty (Friedman, 1972; Slater et al.,
1982, 1984). Many infancy researchers are
interested in the use of novelty preferences
as a methodological tool. Habituation–
dishabituation procedures are used to
demonstrate infants’ discrimination of
stimuli, and seemingly precocious cogni-
tive abilities (e.g., Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke
et al., 1992; but see Schilling, 2000, for a
counterargument).
Infants’ interest in novelty is consistent
with theories of habituation accounting
for both human and animal respond-
ing. However, there is substantial evidence
that infants do not always prefer a novel
stimulus—sometimes they prefer to attend
to a familiar stimulus. In Rose et al.
(1982) groups of 3.5- and 6.5-month-olds
were exposed to a visual stimulus for dif-
ferent durations. This familiar stimulus
was then paired with a novel stimulus.
Infants at both ages displayed familiar-
ity preferences after shorter exposures,
and novelty preferences after longer expo-
sures. Similarly, Hunter et al. (1983) pre-
sented 8- and 12-month-olds with a set
of toys, and tested their preference for
the familiar vs. novel toys after differing
amounts of familiarization. The infants
preferred the familiar toys after a shorter
familiarization period, and the novel toys
after a longer familiarization period. In
these studies, familiarization time was
manipulated between groups of infants.
Roder et al. (2000) provide a within-
infants demonstration that 4.5-month-
olds preferences shift from familiarity to
novelty as a function of familiarization
time.
While familiarity and novelty prefer-
ences have largely been investigated for the
visual modality, there is also evidence that
infants display these preferences for audi-
tory stimuli (e.g., Colombo and Bundy,
1983; Spence, 1996). More recent research
has found that infants’ preferences will also
“reverse” as their memory for a familiar-
ized stimulus decays over time. In Bahrick
and Pickens (1995), 3-month-olds dis-
played a novelty preference after a 1min
retention interval, and a familiarity pref-
erence after a 1 month interval (see also
Spence, 1996; Bahrick et al., 1997; Courage
and Howe, 2001). Familiarity preferences
do not just occur to repetitions of a
specific stimulus. Infants who have cat-
egorized a set of stimuli will sometimes
attend more to a novel stimulus from the
same category, rather than a novel stim-
ulus drawn from a novel category (e.g.,
Gomez and Gerken, 1999; Fiser and Aslin,
2002; Gómez and Maye, 2005; Mather and
Plunkett, 2011). Hunter and Ames (1988)
provide a descriptive model of infants’
familiarity and novelty preferences. The
main factor is familiarization time—with
briefer exposures, the infant attends more
to a familiar stimulus, but with longer
exposures, their attention turns to nov-
elty. How quickly an infant makes this
“familiarity-to-novelty shift” will depend
on their processing speed and the com-
plexity of the stimuli. Hence, familiarity
preferences are more likely for younger
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infants (slower processors), and for more
complex stimuli.
Familiarity preferences are not consis-
tent with the habituation process, where
attention simply declines with repeated
exposure to a stimulus (Thompson and
Spencer, 1966). Some computational
models of infant attention have tenta-
tively linked familiarity preferences with
the process of sensitization (Sirois and
Mareschal, 2004; Schoner and Thelen,
2006). Sensitization occurs when the pre-
sentation of a stimulus leads to heightened
behavioral responding. Importantly, if a
stimulus is repeated, it can have the effect
of sensitizing itself. Under dual-process
theory (Groves and Thompson, 1970),
habituation and sensitization are sepa-
rate, opposing processes which interact
to determine responding. Sensitization
is related to stimuli intensity, and decays
quickly. If sensitization is initially stronger
than habituation, there will be an early
increase in responding to a repeated stim-
ulus, followed by a decrease. This pattern
of response to a repeated stimulus is
similar to the familiarity–novelty shift
sometimes evidenced by infants. However,
in contrast to habituation, sensitization
will generalize to a wide range of stim-
uli (see Domjan, 1998, for examples).
Hence, while sensitization can occur to
a repeated stimulus, it would also gen-
eralize to other stimuli if they were also
present. This means that sensitization can-
not account for the stimulus specificity
of familiarity and novelty preferences (see
also Turk-Browne et al., 2008, for a related
argument).
THE OLD OR THE NEW?
An alternative theoretical perspective
could account for the existence of familiar-
ity preferences. Since the 1950’s, a variety
of arguments have been made that both
adults and infants prefer stimuli which
provide an optimal level of novelty or
information (Dember and Earl, 1957;
Berlyne, 1960; McCall andMcGhee, 1977).
The optimum is defined by a “moderate”
discrepancy between a stimulus and an
observer’s representation of that stimulus.
Hence, the more discrepant a stimulus
is from the observer’s state of knowl-
edge, the more novel it is to the observer.
Relatedly, stimulus complexity influences
the amount of learning required to reduce
this discrepancy. Any stimulus which is
more or less discrepant than the opti-
mum is of less interest to the observer.
The familiarity-to-novelty shift displayed
by infants is consistent with optimal-level
theory. It is possible for a familiar stim-
ulus to be favored over a novel stimulus,
because the familiar stimulus could ini-
tially be closer to the optimum. Further
processing of the familiar stimulus will
result in a shift away from the optimum,
and a novel stimulus will be preferred
(see Hunter and Ames, 1988, for an
elaboration).
A problem with obtaining evidence of
the familiarity-to-novelty shift is that there
is a temporally limited window for observ-
ing a familiarity preference. At a certain
point, attention will shift toward novelty,
thus a successful experimental design must
be sensitive to this shift. Different infants
will also process information at different
rates, meaning that individual preferences
can be obscured by group data (see Roder
et al., 2000). Unfortunately, optimal-level
theory does not provide a remedy for
these methodological issues. The key vari-
ables involved—stimulus complexity, pro-
cessing speed, and the optimal level of
novelty—are usually unknown quantities.
This makes it difficult to predict the occur-
rence of familiarity preferences, and to
test the assumptions of the theory (see
Thomas, 1971). A lack of familiarity pref-
erence could be due to the stimuli not
being sufficiently complex, or an infant
rapidly processing the stimuli. Therefore,
while the existence of familiarity prefer-
ences is consistent with optimal-level the-
ory, the theory itself perhaps does little
more than assert that we seek out moder-
ately novel stimuli.
One approach to dealing with the
shortcomings of optimal-level theory has
been to develop more computationally
explicit models of familiarity and nov-
elty preferences (Sirois and Mareschal,
2004; Schoner and Thelen, 2006; see also
Perone et al., 2011) and to mathemati-
cally formalize the information content of
a stimulus (e.g., Kidd et al., 2012). These
recent advances offer an improved level
of theoretical precision over past formula-
tions of optimal-level theory. Nonetheless,
these models incorporate some of the
basic assumptions of optimal-level the-
ory, and may also retain the difficulties
of predicting the familiarity-to-novelty
shift. Our ability to understand exactly
when infants will seek out familiarity
or novelty is likely to require a deeper
understanding of why there is an opti-
mum in the first place. Development
requires a balance of familiarization
with regularities in the environment
(Gibson, 1969) and shifting attention
to what is new and unknown so as to
create new cognitive structures (Piaget,
1936/1952). Therefore, rather than just
focusing on preferences for individual
stimuli, one useful approach might be
to explore the more global consequences
for the abstraction and development of
knowledge.
ORDER AND TIMING: THE CYCLE OF
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
The familiarity-to-novelty shift causes
infants to process stimuli in a particular
sequence. That is, with all other factors
held constant, infants’ will explore differ-
ent stimuli in a systematic fashion, based
on their prior experience and learning.
Beyond the laboratory, how do these pref-
erences shape patterns of learning across
the vast multitude of items and events in
the real world, across multiple timescales?
Computational models and experimental
data demonstrate how the pattern of input
can influence the trajectory and success
of learning. In Elman (1993), recurrent
neural networks were more successful at
acquiring grammatical categories if they
began by only learning about a subset of
the total sentences available, rather than
learning about all sentences together (see
also Plunkett andMarchman, 1991, 1993).
Other research suggests that order effects
may also occur in infant categorization
(Sandhofer and Doumas, 2008; Mather
and Plunkett, 2011). What is particularly
intriguing is that in some cases, expo-
sure to an initially restricted stimulus set
supports learning (Elman, 1993), whereas
in other cases, reduced variability hin-
ders learning (see Mather and Plunkett,
2011). These findings hint at a global
effect of optimal preferences on successful
learning.
Currently, we understand little about
the role that familiarity and novelty prefer-
ences might play in driving successful pat-
terns of learning. However, if we can better
understand the effects of these preferences
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on cognitive development, then we might
make sense of the underlying cause of opti-
mal preferences. Conversely, our explana-
tions of cognitive development would also
benefit from understand the impact of
exploratory behavior on learning. Much
current developmental research is con-
cerned with specifying the mechanisms
of learning, without considering how and
why attention prioritizes certain stim-
uli for learning. Cognitive development
needs to be understood as a cyclical pro-
cess, where attention influences learn-
ing, and learning guides attention. If, as
Piaget (1936/1952) argued, the child is
actively engaged in the construction of
their own knowledge, then exploratory
behavior needs to be placed at the heart of
cognitive development.
CONCLUSIONS
A hallmark of human behavior is that we
seek to explore and understand our envi-
ronments, even in the absence of biological
or externally specified goals. Our interest
in what is new and unknown is evident
from birth. However, we do not yet have
a clear understanding of the mechanisms
which determine whether a child attends
to familiarity or novelty. The function of
optimal preferences may need to be inter-
preted in the context of broader devel-
opmental changes. Both the processes of
cognitive growth and exploratory behavior
can be better understood by considering
their interdependence.
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